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Abstract
Various demand side mechanisms are advocated to reduce peak electricity loads, including direct load con-
trol, which comprises remotely shifting load to off-peak periods. Empirical evidence across several elec-
tricity markets reveals heterogeneous customer preferences for these and other electricity service offerings
but relatively little is understood concerning the drivers of this preference heterogeneity. Using a discrete
choice experiment examining the potential role of domestic appliance curtailment contracts as a means of
shifting load, this paper investigates potential drivers of preference heterogeneity with respect to electric-
ity services. Among the research findings are that almost 4-in-5 customers engage with the proposition of
appliance curtailment contracts within the context of the survey environment. Customers that previously
switched electricity supplier are among those more likely to consider curtailment contracts. From a policy
perspective the results highlight the potential of appliance curtailment contracts as a tool to manage peak
loads, as well as, the nature of preferences with respect to curtailment contract attributes. The research also
finds that there is no substantial association between either the usual socio-demographic characteristics (e.g.
age, education, etc.) or attitudes to environmental sustainability and preferences for various attributes of
appliance curtailment contracts (e.g. appliance type, frequency of curtailment, opt outs, etc.). The absence
of such a relationship makes it more difficult to forecast demand, to plan for infrastructure, and to design
and market appliance curtailment contracts to customers.
Keywords: demand side management, direct load control, load shifting, preferences, behaviour, attitudes
1. Introduction
Supplying peak period electricity loads represents a considerable challenge for electricity network man-
agers, and is one that is likely to become more acute with the increased integration of renewable energy
sources, such as solar and wind power onto the grid. Demand for electricity is concentrated during certain
periods of the day, specifically in the evening between 5pm and 8pm. This poses challenges to network
operators who must provide additional capacity to the grid in order to meet this demand, as supply and
demand for electricity must be matched to ensure voltage stability. As network operators strive to incor-
porate more power generation from renewable technologies onto the grid in an effort to reduce associated
carbon emissions, this problem becomes exacerbated due to the non-dispatchable feature of many renew-
able energy sources. Whereas supply side solutions traditionally involve methods such as the provision of
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additional power, facilitated by bringing more generators online or utilising technologies such as pumped
storage, increasing levels of attention are now being placed upon demand side solutions, that is, reducing
the need for increased supply in the peak period.
Several demand side management (DSM) mechanisms have been proposed to reduce peak loads. Dy-
namic, time-of-use or critical-peak pricing, facilitated by smart meters, are broadly one approach. Real-life
trials indicate that such pricing mechanisms can be effective in reducing peak period demand [12, 13, 34].
However, a number of concerns regarding implementation of such pricing mechanisms have been raised, in-
cluding consumers’ apprehensions about how such measures work in everyday life [10]; about the longevity
of price effects [34]; and also that the level of response is dependent on customer preferences [33]. Another
approach is direct load control (DLC), which shifts load to periods of lesser demand. DLC typically in-
volves a remotely operated switch cycling off specific loads (e.g. freezers, air conditioners, water heating)
for short periods of time. The operation of DLC load shifting is often imperceptible to electricity customers,
though concern has been expressed around loss of customer control [38, 44]. Evidence from Great Britain
suggests that electricity tariffs permitting DLC are preferable to time-of-use tariffs, within specific parame-
ters [14]. DLC can also be applied to customer loads where the impact of curtailment is easily observable
by homeowners, for example, where the curtailed appliances may include ovens, dishwashers, washing
machines and tumble dryers. During such curtailment events homeowners are directly inconvenienced and
homeowners’ willingness to participate in DLC may differ depending on the nature of the appliances under
control. Irrespective of whether the policy mechanism to curtail peak loads is a price signal encouraging
active decisions by consumers (e.g. time-of-use pricing), or a passive decisions (e.g. participation in DLC)
similar challenges are facing electricity utilities. To successfully implement such policies requires a strong
understanding of customer preferences, a topic where there is a considerable gap in knowledge.
Historically, electricity utilities were not particularly interested in understanding the detailed nature of
customer demand. A main concern of electricity utilities was that they had sufficient infrastructure to supply
loads at any particular time. They used standard customer-supply contracts and usually had no information
on individual customer’s load profiles through time, rather they were concerned with cumulative loads at
electricity nodes. From an electrical engineering perspective residential customers were treated as homoge-
nous for the purpose of designing distribution networks. Utilities’ understanding of customers was confined
to monthly or bi-monthly electric meter readings with no information on the purpose of the load nor about
their customers (e.g. socio-demographic information). But there is considerable evidence that homeowner
preferences for electricity service are not homogenous [e.g. 46, 45, 25].
To help electric utilities successfully implement demand side mechanisms a better understanding of
electricity consumers’ preferences for attributes of electricity services would be useful. First, an under-
standing of preferences for electricity services is beneficial. In the context of DSM mechanisms this in-
cludes knowledge of preferences for various attributes of the service, including frequency of curtailments,
or opt out mechanisms, as well as a measure of the price elasticity towards the DSM mechanism. As
noted, heterogeneity in preferences with respect to DSM mechanisms should be anticipated. For each of
the attributes of the DSM mechanism some fraction of customers may be positively disposed towards the
feature, whereas others may experience disutility from the attribute. With strongly heterogeneous prefer-
ences, the design of a DSM mechanism and the associated customer contracts becomes challenging. In
addition to an understanding of the preference heterogeneity with respect to electricity services, the second
piece of beneficial intelligence is being able to systematically quantify which customer characteristics are
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either positively or negatively associated with DSM attributes. For example, working families with young
children may experience greater disutility associated with curtailment of laundry appliances compared to
other electricity customers. Intelligence of this nature is beneficial for network operators in planning and
forecasting demand, and for marketing DSM contracts to customers. DSM contracts that incorporate, for
example, a DLC component that potentially curtails a specific appliance are only beneficial to utilities and
network operators if the contract is binding on customers. If a designated appliance is rarely used during
the curtailment period, e.g. the evening peak, there is no network benefit from its curtailment. Information
that helps identify where real potentially curtailable loads arise will help minimise dead-weight losses as-
sociated with DSM contracts. Across these three areas there is already a growing literature. For example,
Dutta and Mitra [11] provide a review of literature focused on the dynamic pricing of electricity, whereas
several studies examine customer preferences for various DLC contracts including revealing the nature of
preference heterogeneity [e.g. 4, 43]. There is less research on the drivers of preference heterogeneity asso-
ciated with DSM electricity contracts, specifically what are the associated customer characteristics or other
revealed origins of preferences. This paper contributes to that literature, exploring systematic or easily
identifiable drivers of customer preferences for residential DLC curtailment contracts. We find that neither
electricity customers’ personal characteristics nor their environmental behaviours are associated with their
preferences for electricity supply contracts. While there is strong preference heterogeneity for electricity
supply service, as experienced in other empirical studies, there is relatively little insight into the drivers of
preferences across customers.
The concept DLC curtailment contracts, as presented in this paper, represents a technologically feasi-
ble means of implementing demand side management to reduce load during the evening peak by utilising
smart appliances and smart grid technology. Through such contracts customers cede the ability to curtail
the use of their appliance(s) to their electricity provider or network operator, usually in exchange for mon-
etary compensation. Consequently electricity providers can shift load to periods when demand is lower,
hence reducing the need to increase generation activities, while customers receive financial compensation.
Curtailment contracts are not technically difficult to implement but there is a need to investigate issues sur-
rounding customer acceptance and associated behaviours [49], as these may represent barriers to successful
implementation. If curtailment contracts are to become commonplace, a better understanding of the critical
design features of the contracts will be required, including the needs of different customer types.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. The next section provides further background on the policy
context for domestic curtailment contracts and reviews prior literature in the area. The methodology sec-
tion outlines both the standard approach used to model customer preferences and then outlines the methods
applied to investigate the underlying drivers of preference heterogeneity. The empirical application is based
on a discrete choice survey dataset examining preferences towards DCL curtailment contracts for specific
domestic appliances. Results are presented in section 4, with policy implications discussed in section 5 and
conclusions in section 6 .
2. Background and Literature Review
With the overwhelming majority of the scientific community in agreement that the emission of green-
house gases from human activities is having a destabilising effect on the global climate [6], it is becoming
increasing apparent that there is a need to decouple electricity production from carbon intensive fossil fuels,
and to transition towards greener renewable generation technologies, such as wind and solar. Within the
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European Union there are collective and Member State targets for renewable energy generation [54]. One
means available to meet these targets is the implementation of peak load demand management tools. The
principal motivation for the implementation of such measures is the increased variability in generation as-
sociated with renewable power sources in comparison to traditional fossil fuel generation technologies. The
integration of renewable power generation technologies into power systems presents substantial challenges
to network managers seeking to balance electricity supply and demand [24]. The problem of matching
supply and demand becomes especially critical during peak evening periods, where demand for power in-
creases significantly, as individuals return home from work and education. One method of alleviating this
pressure upon the network is to increase demand side flexibility, specifically as facilitated by smart devices
with the ability to delay or curtail appliance use until a period when network load is lower. While such an
approach presents a number of technical challenges from an engineering perspective, there are also likely
to be a number of societal challenges if customers’ use of appliances is to be (voluntarily) restricted and
thereby requiring behavioural change.
Several studies have established that DLC related to domestic appliances, such as refrigerators and dish-
washers, can be successful in the sense that customers defer sufficient load to provide network benefits. In
Turkey smart scheduling of refrigerator cycles has the potential to shift 38% of fridge load out of the peak
period [57], while shifting washing machine and dishwasher cycles can reduce peak loads related to these
applicants by 13–24% in Latvia [30]. In a study from the United States the demand response potential
among six household appliances ranked clothes dryers as having the greatest demand response potential,
followed by water heaters, air conditioners, dishwashers, clothes washers and refrigerators [40]. Electric
ovens were ranked as having no demand response potential, as curtailment of oven loads would significantly
impact customer convenience. From a network operator perspective, demand response is seen as a means
of better integrating renewables, lowering operational costs, providing higher levels of reliability, lowering
emissions and providing reserve services to the network [9, 39]. From a network management perspective
such an approach has clear benefits, but the implementation of such measures is dependent on customer
acceptance, specifically with respect to loss of control of their appliances.
While curtailment contracts are a feature in some markets (e.g. related to air conditioning in the United
States) they have not been extensively studied. The implementation of demand management measures via
DLCs need to be cognisant of insights from both social psychology and behavioural economics in order
to realise the potential benefits of such measures [17]. Customers have to be actively engaged in demand
response activities if such initiatives are to be successful [16] and any remote load shifting regime that
utilities seek to implement should be compatible with customers’ lifestyles [27]. There is also the need
to strike a balance between the simplicity of the customer contracts and the ability for customers to tai-
lor such contracts to their individual needs [21]. Australian research identifies customer trust in electric
utilities as an important determinant in DLC uptake [51]. A meta-analysis of domestic electricity demand
response programmes finds that programme success is also associated with certain socio-spatial charac-
teristics, including the level of urbanisation, economic growth, and in areas with renewable energy policy
supports [50]. A study in the United States also finds certain socio-demographic traits associated with DLC
programme acceptance [56], however, the socio-demographic traits are very broadly defined (e.g. ethnic-
ity of while/non-white; political affiliation of republican/democrat/independent) which limits the practical
usefulness of the results either for load forecasting or curtailment programme marketing purposes. A few
studies have examined preferences for specific attributes of DLC contracts via discrete choice experiments.
A Swedish study finds that customers place substantial value on not being controlled and require much
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greater compensation to restrict appliance use compared to domestic heating, though they are more accom-
modating in extreme situations [4]. A subsequent Swedish study confirms that high levels of compensation
(i.e. higher than the marginal cost of electricity supply) are required to offset higher levels and durations of
DLC curtailments [3]. In Great Britain electricity customers also require statistically significant compen-
sation to accept remote monitoring and load control by an external provider [43], though the magnitude of
compensation is relatively low compared to the Swedish studies. These studies [i.e. 4, 3, 43] reveal signif-
icant preference heterogeneity but the estimated models do not reveal the sources of heterogeneity, though
in one instance via a multinomial logit model (MNL) attribute heterogeneity to differences in income, age,
technology savviness and socio-economic status [43]. The current paper builds upon the standard mixed
logit analysis, similar to that undertaken in [4, 3] and [43], and uses estimates from the standard model to
identify whether respondent characteristics, such as socio-demographic or behavioural variables, have any
explanatory power related to preference heterogeneity.
3. Methodology
The methodological approach initially follows a common approach to examining heterogeneous prefer-
ences: survey data collection via discrete choice experiment (DCE) and using a mixed logit model for data
analysis. Several electricity curtailment contract studies follow this approach [e.g. 4, 3, 43]. The second
stage, post model estimation, explores whether there are identifiable drivers of preference heterogeneity.
3.1. Discrete Choice Experiment
Electricity customer decisions on each attribute of curtailment contracts are not made in isolation. Cus-
tomers are usually presented with a number of contract options, similar to the experience today when cus-
tomers switch electricity suppliers, from which they make a choice. A DCE mimics the real-life contract
selection decision and customers’ decisions reflect their underlying preferences for electricity services. A
DCE survey elicits preference data based on a realistic hypothetical electricity ‘market’. Within the survey
customers are asked to state their choice over different hypothetical alternatives, one of which is always the
customer’s existing, or status quo, electricity contract that has no appliance curtailment features. The survey
responses allows researchers to determine the relative importance of contract attributes.
The analysis of customers’ choice decisions is based on the Random Utility Model (RUM) [35]. With
the RUM model a customer chooses from a number contract options comprising various contract attributes
(e.g. curtailment frequency, opt outs, compensation) and selects the contract that yields the highest expected
utility level. The utility that customer n derives from contract alternative j is
Un j = β′Xn j + n j (1)
where Xn j is a vector of contract attributes, β a vector of unobserved coefficients, and n j is an unobserved
error term. A number of approaches are commonly used to quantitatively model choice decisions and es-
timate the parameters of the utility function (1). The mixed logit model1 approach allows for preference
heterogeneity plus it explicitly models the panel nature of the data where within DCE surveys respondents
are presented with several choice decisions. In the mixed logit model the β coefficient is assumed to vary
1Also referred to as random parameter logit (RPL), mixed multinomial logit (MMNL), kernel logit and hybrid logit
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across customers in the population with density f (βn|θ), where θ represents the true parameter of prefer-
ences. Under that assumption the utility that customer n derives from contract alternative j is
Un jt = β′nXn jt + n jt (2)
with βn a vector of unobserved random coefficients and t is the index for the DCE choice decision. Assum-
ing the error term is identically and independently distributed (iid) extreme value, the conditional choice
probability of contract i for customer n on choice occasion t is [22, 52]:
Pn jt|βn = exp(β
′
nXn jt)∑J
j=1 exp(β
′Xn jt)
(3)
With βn unobserved, the unconditional probability is the integral of Pn jt|βn over all values of βn
Pn jt =
∫
(
exp(β′nXn jt)∑J
j=1 exp(β
′Xn jt)
) f (βn|θ)dβn (4)
Equation (4) is estimated using a simulated maximum likelihood estimator based on 1,000 Halton draws,
as the model cannot be evaluated analytically due to the integral operator [22, 52]. Although this paper is
concerned with drivers of preference heterogeneity rather preferences estimates reported in willingness
to pay/willingness to accept space, willingness to accept (WTA) estimates are reported for completeness.
WTA is calculated as the negative of the quotient of the marginal utility the non-monetary contract attributes
within the βn vector and the marginal utility of money, which is the element of the βn vector associated with
the compensation attribute in the curtailment contract.
3.2. Analysis of Heterogeneity
Having estimated the mixed logit model the next stage is to examine whether there are identifiable
drivers of preference heterogeneity. One approach to examine drivers of heterogeneity is the use of latent
class models where the observed distribution of customer preferences is a mixture of the preferences of a
finite number of groups with the drivers of heterogeneity investigated through the explanatory variables for
group membership [36]. While the latent class model has parallels with the mixed logit model above, it is a
separately estimated model. The approach followed here persists with the mixed logit model estimates and
undertakes post-estimation analysis.
Usually estimation of mixed logit models is based on all completed DCE survey responses, allowing
for any necessary data cleaning. If the survey sample is representative of the population of interest, i.e.
all electricity customers, the model results can be easily extrapolated for policy purposes. However, there
may be distinct sub-groups within the population of electricity customers. Those that have preferences for
curtailment contracts, or aspects thereof, either positive or negative, and those that have no preferences
over curtailment contracts, as presented in the DCE survey, for ideological or other reasons. A broad-based
literature has developed around this issue in the environmental non-market valuation literature, which ul-
timately concludes that protest responses should be modelled separately from respondents that positively
engage with the hypothetical market in the DCE questionnaire [28, 29, 18, 2]. Taking that approach our
analysis follows two strands; respondents in the DCE that engage with curtailment contracts and respon-
dents that do not. For our purposes we define non-engagement with curtailment contracts as customers that
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always select the status-quo option in the DCE survey.
The first consideration of the drivers of preference heterogeneity is modelling engagement/ non-engagement.
A standard logit model is proposed to estimate the probability of non-engagement as a function of variables
describing the socio-demographic and other characteristics of customers [18]. Statistically significant pa-
rameter estimates will indicate customer characteristics that are more closely associated with curtail contract
engagement.
The second strand focuses on customers that engaged with the curtailment contract DCE. To undertake
this analysis the mixed logit model (4) is estimated, conditional on engagement with the survey . Estimates
of βn are usually reported as both the mean and standard deviation of βn and from which customer specific
coefficient estimates of βn for each attribute in the DCE curtailment contract are recovered. These βn values
are customer specific estimates of the marginal utility associated with each curtailment contract attribute. To
help understand the potential drivers of these preference values, the βn are regressed on customers’ socio-
demographic characteristics. These regression equations, of which there are six in the empirical application,
could be estimated separately but the error terms across equations are likely to be correlated due to some
driver of customer preferences unknown to the researcher but which has an effect on utility from all contract
attributes. The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimator [58], which assumes a joint distribution for
the error terms from the individual equations, is used to estimate the equations. The motivation for using
the SUR rather than an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is that there can be an efficiency gain in
simultaneous estimation by combining information on different equations. The SUR model is:
βni = ziγi + νi i = 1 . . . 6 (5)
with M customer observations βni is a M × 1 vector, zi is a M × ki matrix of explanatory variables, γi is
a ki × 1 vector, and νi is a M × 1 vector of errors. The dimension of ki may vary between equations (i.e.
the number of explanatory variables may differ across equations). Stacking the equations the system can be
expressed as
βn = zγ + ν (6)
The assumptions on the error term are that E[νi] = 0 and E[νiν′j] = σi jI. The latter assumption allows
errors in different equations corresponding to the same respondent electricity customer to be correlated and
it is this assumption that makes the SUR estimator more efficient than OLS estimates equation by equation.2
3.3. Data
The dataset was collected as part of an online survey undertaken in the summer of 2018. The sample re-
cruited for the survey was designed to be statistically representative of the Irish population in terms of age,
gender, region, and employment status, as recorded by the 2016 census of population. The survey com-
prised four distinct sections, the first eliciting respondents’ time-specific appliance use habits, the second
contained the DCE component where respondents first watched an animated video describing the hypotheti-
cal curtailment contracts and afterwards faced eight separate choice tasks. The third part involved a number
2See [26] for more detailed exposition of the SUR model (p. 444).
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of post DCE debriefing questions, and the last part collected information on respondents’ background and
attitudes. Two pilot studies were undertaken to establish the suitability of DCE attributes and levels, and
test the other questions, tutorial video and the overall layout of the survey.
In total 1,519 respondents completed the survey, though 539 observations were dropped due to their
failure to correctly answer two screening questions in the survey instrument. The screening questions were
included to ensure data quality by determining whether respondents were paying adequate attention rather
than arbitrarily selecting responses. Observations within the 5% fastest and and slowest survey completion
times were also excluded reducing the sample by a further 108 observations. The final sample comprises
972 respondents with an average survey completion time of 15 minutes. Descriptive statistics for the full
sample, and engagement/ non-engagement sub-samples are reported in Table 1
For the purposes of this study curtailment contracts are defined by a number of attributes outlined in
Table 2, including four named domestic appliances to be curtailed, the maximum number of curtailments
per household per month, whether there is a twelve hour advanced notice of a curtailment, and whether a
household is permitted to opt out of one curtailment event per month, and finally the compensation asso-
ciated with each contract in the form of a utility bill discount (UBD). These attributes were identified in
pre-survey focus groups as being the most important to customers. As appliance curtailment contracts were
not in operation within the Irish domestic electricity market at the time of the study, and due to the relative
complexity of the experiment, an explanatory animated video was used to explain the concept of curtailment
contracts, the constituent parts of the contract, and how to participate in a choice experiment. A Bayesian
efficient experimental design, minimizing the Bayesian D-error, was used to generate 32 distinct choice
scenarios [1, 15, 47]. Priors used in the experimental design were estimated from the pilot study (n=100).
Respondents were randomly assigned one of four blocks of eight choice scenarios to avoid fatigue. Figure
1 illustrates an example choice card.
The socio-economic variables selected as the independent variables, z, in equation (3.2) include the
socio-economic characteristics of respondents, namely: gender, age, income, educational attainment, em-
ployment status, location, and household size. Additional variables included in z include respondents’
environmental behaviours and attitudes, as well information related to their interactions with electricity
suppliers, namely, their in electricity suppliers, electricity bill payment methods, as well as, whether they
switched electricity supplier in the previous three years. In the modelling analysis we examine whether any
of these variables are associated with, or can be considered drivers of, customers’ preferences for curtail-
ment contract attributes. Further information on these variables is included in Table 1
4. Results
The presentation of results is divided into two parts. First, results of the mixed logit model estimates
are presented, which is the standard approach to modelling preference heterogeneity in DCE surveys. The
second set of results focuses on the exploration of the drivers of preference heterogeneity.
4.1. Mixed Logit Modelling Results
The model was estimated in StataTM using the mixlogit command [23]. Results are presented in Table
3 both for the full sample of respondents, and for the sub-sample of ‘engaged’ respondents, i.e. respondents
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: full, ‘engaged’, and ‘not-engaged’ samples
Full sample ‘Engaged’ ‘Not engaged’
N=972 N=810 N=162
Variable Min, Max Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Gender
male 0, 1 0.459 0.499 0.506 0.502 0.449 0.498
female 0, 1 0.541 0.499 0.494 0.502 0.551 0.498
Age
18-34 0, 1 0.265 0.442 0.241 0.429 0.27 0.444
35-54 0, 1 0.391 0.488 0.352 0.479 0.399 0.490
54+ 0, 1 0.344 0.475 0.407 0.493 0.331 0.471
Monthly after-tax income
<e2000 0, 1 0.256 0.437 0.278 0.449 0.252 0.434
e2000–e4000 0, 1 0.488 0.500 0.457 0.500 0.494 0.500
>e2000 0, 1 0.256 0.437 0.265 0.443 0.254 0.436
Education
Up to secondary 0, 1 0.262 0.440 0.278 0.449 0.258 0.438
Tertiary 0, 1 0.354 0.479 0.364 0.483 0.352 0.478
Post-tertiary 0, 1 0.384 0.487 0.358 0.481 0.389 0.488
Employment Status
Other 0, 1 0.419 0.494 0.519 0.501 0.399 0.490
Employed 0, 1 0.581 0.494 0.481 0.501 0.601 0.490
Household size
One 0, 1 0.144 0.351 0.123 0.33 0.148 0.355
Two 0, 1 0.366 0.482 0.364 0.483 0.367 0.482
Three 0, 1 0.193 0.395 0.216 0.413 0.189 0.392
Four 0, 1 0.18 0.384 0.136 0.344 0.189 0.392
Five+ 0, 1 0.116 0.321 0.16 0.368 0.107 0.310
Location
rural 0, 1 0.362 0.481 0.352 0.479 0.364 0.482
urban 0, 1 0.638 0.481 0.648 0.479 0.636 0.482
Scale of environmental behaviours & attitudes
Low 0, 1 0.373 0.484 0.346 0.477 0.379 0.485
Medium 0, 1 0.351 0.477 0.346 0.477 0.352 0.478
High 0, 1 0.276 0.447 0.309 0.463 0.269 0.444
Level of trust in current electricity supplier (likert scale 0=no trust to 10=very high trust)
Trust 0, 10 6.949 2.232 7.15 2.395 6.908 2.198
Switched electricity supplier in past 3 years
No 0, 1 0.588 0.492 0.679 0.468 0.570 0.495
Yes 0, 1 0.412 0.492 0.321 0.468 0.430 0.495
Payment type for electricity bill
Cash/Card 0, 1 0.195 0.397 0.235 0.425 0.188 0.391
Bank transfer 0, 1 0.659 0.474 0.611 0.489 0.669 0.471
Prepay 0, 1 0.091 0.287 0.123 0.33 0.084 0.277
Other 0, 1 0.055 0.227 0.031 0.173 0.059 0.236
Proportion using specified appliances in evening period (5–8pm)
Oven 0, 1 0.629 0.483 0.574 0.496 0.640 0.48
Washing machine 0, 1 0.213 0.410 0.198 0.399 0.216 0.412
Dryer 0, 1 0.177 0.382 0.148 0.356 0.183 0.387
Dishwasher 0, 1 0.303 0.460 0.241 0.429 0.316 0.465
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Table 2: Discrete Choice Experiment: Curtailment Contract Attributes and levels
Attribute Explanation Attribute levels
Appliance The appliance type to be curtailed during peak period Electric oven, Tumble dryer, Washing machine, Dishwasher
Frequency The maximum number of curtailment events per month 3, 6, 9
Opt Out Whether the customer can opt out one curtailment event per month Yes, No
Advance Notice Whether the customer receives 12 hour advance notice of a curtailment Yes, No
Compensation Contract compensation as a utility bill discount e10, e20, e30 per bimonthly utility bill
Figure 1: Sample Choice Card
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that selected a least one curtailment option in the DCE, as discussed in section 3.2. The difference between
the two samples is that the smaller ‘engaged’ sample excludes respondents that expressed no preference in
favour of curtailment contracts, potentially for ideological or other reasons. The exclusion of respondents
is reflected in the coefficient estimate for the alternate specific constant (ASC), which relates to the status
quo option. While the estimates of the mean for the ASC are broadly similar between the two samples, the
estimate of the standard deviation is less than half in the ‘engaged’ sample. The second notable difference
between the two samples is that there are more statistically significant coefficient estimates for the ‘engaged’
model compared to the full sample. For example, in the case of the clothes dryer the estimate of the mean
is statistically significant for the ‘engaged’ sample but not for the full sample. For the ‘engaged’ sample the
estimates suggest that preferences for the Opt Out attribute are random across respondents, whereas that is
not the case for the full sample. In both samples the mean coefficient for the dishwasher is not statistically
different than the washing machine reference category.
In addition to utility parameters, Table 3 provides the willingness-to-accept estimates generated from
both the full sample and sub sample mixed logit models. Values remain relatively consistent between the
two models across most attributes. For example, customers require approximately e20 additional com-
pensation to contract for an oven curtailment relative to a washing machine. For each unit increase in the
maximum number of curtailment events per month, mean compensation sought by customers is e1 but they
are willing to forgo almost e4 compensation for advance notice of curtailments and e3 for the ability to
opt out of one curtailment event per month.
More extensive analysis of these mixed logit model estimates are available [20] but the primary focus
of this paper is the heterogeneity of preferences, which is considered in the next section.
4.2. Analysis of Heterogeneity
The first results are a logit model of engagement/ non-engagement with curtailment contracts, which
are reported in Table 4. Before discussing the model estimates it is worthwhile exploring the reasons for
non-engagement. After completing the DCE questions respondents were asked about the reasons for their
responses. Some 19% of non-engaged respondents do not think that curtailment contracts are realistic, a
further 35% did not like the options offered, while 37% do not want to limit appliance use. Just 4% had
difficulty evaluating the options. Consequently there is good reason to believe preferences for curtailment
contracts as considered in the DCE among the non-engaged cohort are substantially different from engaged
respondents’ preferences. The logit model explores whether there are systematic identifiable characteristics
associated with the engagement/ non-engagement dichotomy.
The logit model results are reported as odds ratios. A relatively minor number of explanatory variables
have statistical significance in explaining engagement among customers with curtailment contracts within
the DCE. Customers are 1.6 times more likely to engage with curtailment contracts if they had previously
switched electricity supplier. This potentially indicates a price or cost conscious customer. Customers in
gainful employment are 1.5 times more likely to engage with a curtailment contract that those not in gainful
employment, while likelihood of engagement among larger sized households is lower. The highest likeli-
hood of engagement occurs among customers who’s payment method for their electricity bill is classified
as ‘other’. While further details on the exact circumstances of this category are not available, it comprises
a relatively small proportion of customers, at 5% of the sample. Across all the other socio-demographic
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Table 3: Mixed logit model estimates
Full sample ‘Engaged’
N=972 N=810
Coefficient Std. Error. Coefficient Std. Error.
Compensation (UBD) 0.092*** 0.005 0.09*** 0.005
Random Parameters - mean
Appliances - reference category washing machine
Oven -1.857*** 0.142 -1.773*** 0.136
Dryer 0.144 0.096 0.221** 0.094
Dishwasher -0.065 0.087 -0.044 0.085
Curtailment frequency -0.099*** 0.013 -0.085*** 0.012
Advance Notice 0.359*** 0.049 0.355*** 0.049
Opt Out 0.271*** 0.043 0.264*** 0.042
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) 0.357* 0.193 -0.378*** 0.136
Random Parameters - standard deviations
Appliances - reference category washing machine
Oven 2.150*** 0.141 2.118*** 0.148
Dryer 1.806*** 0.141 1.783*** 0.130
Dishwasher 1.311*** 0.131 1.299*** 0.119
Curtailment frequency 0.179*** 0.018 0.161*** 0.014
Advance Notice 0.664*** 0.088 0.581*** 0.089
Opt Out 0.141 0.112 0.172* 0.100
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) 4.302*** 0.244 2.086*** 0.114
Willingness to Accept
Oven e20.11*** 1.445 e19.78*** 1.445
Dryer e-1.55 1.058 e-2.46** 1.071
Dishwasher e0.70 0.934 e0.50 0.949
Curtailment frequency e1.07*** 0.123 e0.95*** 0.118
Advance Notice e-3.88*** 0.533 e-3.96*** 0.548
Opt Out e-2.93*** 0.480 e-2.94*** 0.479
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) e-3.87* 2.056 e4.22*** 1.589
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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variables, including variables describing customers’ environmental behaviours and attitudes, none are sta-
tistically significant. Overall, with the exception of a few variables, socio-demographic variables are not
strongly associated with engagement/ non-engagement outcome for curtailment contracts
The second set of results are from the SUR model, which was estimated using the sureg command
within StataTM. The dependent variables in the model are the βn coefficients associated with each of the six
attributes in the DCE curtailment survey calculated for each survey respondent. The estimates are reported
in Table 5. The R2 statistic associated with each equation is between 0.02 and 0.07, so overall the models
do not have much explanatory power. Using Chi-square tests, only in three of the six equations can we
reject at the 5% level, a null hypothesis that the fit of an intercept-only model and the models estimated are
equal. The inclusion of socio-demographic and behavioural/attitudes information as explanatory variables
has not improved the fit of the model in these instances. This applies to the Opt Out and Advance Notice
regressions and marginally so in the case of the Dishwasher regression.
In the case of the appliance regressions, i.e. Electric Oven, Clothes Dryer, as well as the Frequency
regression, socio-demographic and behavioural/attitudes information has some explanatory power with re-
spect to customers preferences for these attributes in curtailment contracts. Household size is the attribute
most associated with customers’ expressed preferences. In the case of electric oven curtailments, larger
sized households experience disutility relative to single occupancy households. However, contrary to what
one might expect the level of effect declines with household size with the estimated coefficients increas-
ing in magnitude from -0.618 in case of two person household to -0.363 for four person household and a
statistically insignificant coefficient even at 10% level for larger households. In the case of the other two
appliances (i.e. clothes dryer and dishwasher) relative to the washing machine, estimated coefficients are
positive in sign, whereas the coefficient magnitudes are broadly similar across household size relative to
a single occupancy household. Relative to the washing machine, customers with larger families are more
positively disposed to curtailment contracts with respect to their dishwasher or clothes dryer.
Across gender, age, income and education there is no obvious driver or association between these cus-
tomer characteristics and preferences for curtailment contract attributes. In most instances the coefficient
estimates for these socio-demographic variables are statistically insignificant. Where they are statistically
significant it is difficult to deduce an obvious trend across curtailment attributes. There are similar results in
the case of the variable capturing customers’ scale of environmental behaviours. This variable represents a
customer’s score on how concerned they are for environmental sustainability, including in the actions they
take (e.g. purchasing decisions). Our expectation was that customers with a greater concern for environ-
mental sustainability may be more disposed to undertaking actions that increase the integration of renewable
generation on the electricity network and reduce peak loads supplied by fossil fuel generation, as experi-
enced in other fora [55]. The estimates show no support for such a hypothesis. In fact, the only coefficient
estimates that are statistically significant are counter to that hypothesis, indicating that those with higher
concern for environmental sustainability experience disutility from higher levels of curtailment events.
We noted earlier that customers who switched electricity supplier in the prior three years are more likely
to engage with curtailment contracts. There is no evidence that such customers systematically have prefer-
ences for specific attributes of engagement contracts. Neither is there any systematic association between
electricity bill payment method or trust in electricity supplier and preferences for specific attributes.
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Table 4: Logit Model Results: Engagement with curtailment contracts
Odds Ratio Std. Error
Gender - (male)
Female 1.124 0.208
Age (18-34)
35-54 0.907 0.218
54+ 0.660 0.176
Monthly after tax income (<e2000)
e2000–e4000 1.109 0.255
>e2000 0.901 0.231
Education (up to secondary)
Tertiary 0.826 0.192
Post-tertiary 0.853 0.207
Employment Status (other)
Employed 1.491** 0.297
Household size (one person)
Two 0.733 0.220
Three 0.562* 0.187
Four 0.780 0.285
Five+ 0.398** 0.148
Location (rural)
Urban 0.899 0.170
Scale of environmental behaviours & attitudes (low)
Medium 0.876 0.190
High 0.740 0.166
Level of trust in current electricity supplier
Trust 0.959 0.039
Payment type for electricity bill (cash/card)
Bank transfer 1.179 0.267
Prepay 0.729 0.241
Other 2.976* 1.688
Switched electricity supplier in past 3 years (No)
Yes 1.599** 0.314
Used specified appliance in evening peak period
Oven 1.252 0.232
Washing machine 1.349 0.291
Dryer 0.823 0.201
Dishwasher 1.369 0.371
Constant 7.247*** 4.131
Reference categories described in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model Estimates: βn regressed on socio-demographic variables
Electric Clothes Dishwasher Frequency Advance Opt Out
Oven Dryer Notice
Gender - (male)
Female -0.001 -0.086 -0.086 -0.013* -0.027 0.003
(0.110) (0.094) (0.059) (0.007) (0.019) (0.003)
Age (18-34)
35-54 -0.141 0.233** 0.046 0.038*** -0.042* 0.003
(0.138) (0.117) (0.074) (0.009) (0.024) (0.003)
54+ 0.075 -0.017 -0.093 0.036*** -0.065** 0.001
(0.156) (0.133) (0.084) (0.010) (0.027) (0.004)
Monthly after tax income (<e2000)
e2000–e4000 -0.301** 0.369*** 0.048 0.008 -0.024 0.001
(0.140) (0.119) (0.075) (0.009) (0.024) (0.003)
>e2000 -0.167 0.317** 0.110 -0.007 -0.014 -0.002
(0.159) (0.134) (0.085) (0.010) (0.028) (0.004)
Education (up to secondary)
Tertiary -0.015 0.009 0.001 0.017* 0.023 -0.001
(0.141) (0.119) (0.075) (0.009) (0.025) (0.003)
Post-tertiary 0.102 -0.047 -0.006 -0.005 0.006 0.003
(0.146) (0.123) (0.078) (0.009) (0.025) (0.003)
Employment Status (other)
Employed 0.105 -0.074 -0.030 0.005 -0.009 -0.004
(0.122) (0.103) (0.065) (0.008) (0.021) (0.003)
Household size (one person)
Two -0.618*** 0.293** 0.234*** -0.018* 0.050* 0.002
(0.169) (0.144) (0.091) (0.011) (0.030) (0.004)
Three -0.429** 0.291* 0.276*** -0.010 0.030 0.006
(0.193) (0.165) (0.103) (0.012) (0.034) (0.004)
Four -0.363* 0.387** 0.223** -0.011 0.055 0.008*
(0.196) (0.168) (0.105) (0.012) (0.034) (0.004)
Five+ -0.152 0.188 0.157 -0.020 0.065 0.008
(0.227) (0.194) (0.122) (0.014) (0.040) (0.005)
Location (rural)
Urban 0.050 0.054 -0.086 -0.002 0.017 -0.002
(0.115) (0.098) (0.061) (0.007) (0.020) (0.003)
Scale of environmental behaviours & attitudes (low)
Medium -0.065 0.120 -0.020 -0.022*** -0.016 -0.002
(0.127) (0.108) (0.068) (0.008) (0.022) (0.003)
High -0.136 -0.155 0.032 -0.025*** -0.010 0.002
(0.137) (0.116) (0.073) (0.009) (0.024) (0.003)
Level of trust in current electricity supplier
Trust -0.046* -0.018 -0.013 0.001 0.007 -0.000
(0.025) (0.021) (0.013) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Payment type for electricity bill (cash/card)
Bank transfer -0.336** 0.112 0.161** 0.004 -0.056** 0.002
(0.145) (0.123) (0.077) (0.009) (0.025) (0.003)
Prepay 0.031 -0.016 -0.056 0.005 -0.053 0.001
(0.227) (0.193) (0.121) (0.014) (0.040) (0.005)
Other -0.437* 0.105 0.044 0.007 -0.055 0.004
(0.260) (0.220) (0.139) (0.017) (0.045) (0.006)
Switched electricity supplier in past 3 years (No)
Yes 0.126 0.018 -0.087 0.007 0.016 -0.005*
(0.115) (0.098) (0.062) (0.007) (0.020) (0.003)
Using the specified appliance in evening period
Oven -0.206*
(0.109)
Dryer 0.300***
(0.116)
Dishwasher 0.087
(0.061)
Constant -0.599* -0.327 -0.167 -0.098*** 0.368*** 0.264***
(0.338) (0.283) (0.178) (0.021) (0.058) (0.008)
R2 0.059 0.050 0.041 0.071 0.028 0.025
χ2 47.310 42.730 32.360 60.500 23.080 20.210
p-value 0.001 0.003 0.054 0.000 0.285 0.445
Standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories also described in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5. Discussion
The objective of the paper is to explore whether there are systematic or easily identifiable drivers of
customer preferences for residential DLC curtailment contracts. Similar to prior research [i.e. 4, 3, 43], we
find that there is strong preference heterogeneity with respect to electricity curtailment contracts. However,
we find that neither electricity customers’ personal characteristics nor their environmental behaviours are
strongly associated with their preferences for attributes of such contracts. Although this might be consid-
ered a non-finding it does have implications for the electricity sector.
Electricity curtailment contracts obviously require customer consent. In some cases curtailment of res-
idential electricity loads will have no impact on customers. For example, where loads for refrigeration
(incl. freezers) and possibly battery charging are curtailed for relatively short periods of time, customers
may not even be aware of the curtailment. Without being inconvenienced it is likely that gaining customer
consent in these instances will be relatively easy. Where customers are inconvenienced by appliance cur-
tailments and have to adjust their daily activities eliciting consent may be more difficult. Both this and prior
research suggests that there there is appetite for appliance curtailment contracts, almost 4 in 5 customers
surveyed contemplated such contracts in this study, though preferences across contract attributes is quite
heterogeneous. Understanding the drivers of preference heterogeneity should help electricity suppliers to
better design and market such contracts. For instance, the analysis here suggests that curtailment contracts
for electric ovens would be very unpopular and would require high levels of compensation to encourage
participation. What we know is that a single, or even a few, standard curtailment contracts are unlikely to be
favoured by a majority of customers due to strong preference heterogeneity. What this paper additionally
finds is that there are no obvious contract types in terms of attribute features that electricity suppliers can
design that are likely to be more strongly favoured by particular customer cohorts. For example, a contract
targetting customers in employment and with large families who might favour contracts with greater opt
out flexibility for curtailment events; or a contract for customers more sensitive to higher frequency of cur-
tailment events. In essence, from a curtailment contract marketing perspective electricity suppliers will not
know in advance which customers are likely to prefer the different types of contracts it develops. Instead,
customers will self-select to the contracts that best fits their preferences and lifestyle.
That there is considerable preference heterogeneity for electricity services is not surprising given the
change in lifestyles, job types, and pace of living over recent decades. In hindsight, given the complexity
and variability in people’s lives it should not be surprising also that no obvious systematic drivers of prefer-
ence heterogeneity have been isolated. Attitudes or behaviour with respect to environmental sustainability
have recently been advocated as possible drivers underpinning customer choices with respect to energy,
specifically space heating and energy efficiency decisions, but there has been little supporting empirical
evidence including from the analysis undertaken here [31, 42, 7].
Appliance curtailment contracts may be subject to adverse selection. In the absence of fully transparent
smart metering data, including appliance loads, electricity suppliers have limited information to execute
contracts that will deliver system wide benefits associated with reducing peak loads. At present electricity
suppliers generally know aggregate customer loads across billing periods but usually have no detailed infor-
mation at finer time resolution or what appliance or other activity is associated with the load served. With
that level of information asymmetry, contracts may be executed that are not constraining on customers based
on their normal daily activities. Such contracts provide no benefit to the electricity supplier nor the wider
electricity system. This research, which fails to isolate drivers of preference heterogeneity with respect to
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usual socio-demographic variables, means that at present electricity suppliers will be unable to reduce the
level of information asymmetry. With the financial risk of such contracts, electricity suppliers are unlikely
to offer appliance based curtailment contracts without detailed customer information on time-of-use loads.
The role-out of smart metering will facilitate the introduction of curtailment contracts, though individual
appliance curtailments will also necessitate suitably enabled appliances.
The transition to a low carbon future envisages households contemplating many behaviour changing
decisions. For example, switching to electric vehicles or investing in energy efficiency home retrofits. Em-
pirical studies find that such investments are more highly concentrated within certain socio-demographic
profiles, especially related to income, education, and among families that own their homes [48, 32, 53, 19].
Lack of access to domestic finance, and the split incentive between tenants and landlords, among other
barriers, preclude a substantial share of families from recovering the associated benefits (e.g. lower energy
demand or fuel costs) of such investments [41, 8, 5, 37]. The analysis here suggests that curtailment con-
tracts may be accessible to a broader spectrum of customers. We find little convincing evidence that any
cohort of customers are likely to feel precluded from participation in curtailment contracts when they are
offered by electricity suppliers. Unlike many government programmes encouraging transition to low-carbon
alternatives (e.g. subsidies for electric vehicles, or home energy retrofit grants), curtailment contracts may
be more equitable in their appeal.
6. Conclusions
Heterogeneity of customer preferences with respect to provision of electricity services, including cur-
tailment contracts, has been established across several electricity markets [4, 3, 43, 20] but investigation of
the drivers of preference heterogeneity has been largely absent. The current paper builds upon a DCE study
of customer preferences for appliance curtailment contracts to explore whether there are systematic, iden-
tifiable drivers of customer preferences for various attributes of residential curtailment contracts. Subject
to some exceptions, the broad-brush conclusions of the research are that we are unable to find associa-
tion between either the usual socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, education, income, etc.)
or attitudes to environmental sustainability and preferences for various attributes of appliance curtailment
contracts (e.g. appliance type, frequency, opt outs, etc.). The dearth of empirical studies exploring such
preference heterogeneity in the published literature may reflect this ambiguous message on the drivers of
preference heterogeneity.
There are several notable research findings nonetheless. From a representative sample of electricity
consumers we find that approximately 4 in 5 people are willing to contemplate appliance curtailment con-
tracts. It would be naive to assume that sign-up for such contracts in reality would be so high, however,
a substantial majority of customers are willing to evaluate the option. That is a promising proposition for
an electricity industry that may seek to deploy curtailment contracts as a policy to help reduce peak load.
Of the few indicators statistically associated with engagement with curtailment contracts is whether the re-
spondent had previously switched electricity provider. One might assert that switchers are price conscious
and market savvy customers, which ultimately may be the type of customer for which a curtailment contract
may be suitable. While switching practice is associated with curtailment contract engagement, there is no
evidence that it is a driver of, or associated with, any of the contract attributes considered. Electricity supply
switchers are not uniform with respect to preferences for contract attributes.
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With asymmetric information with respect to appliance use patterns favouring the customer rather than
the electricity supplier, and without a strong understanding of the nature of preference heterogeneity, it is
unlikely that appliance curtailment contracts will be widely deployed in the Irish market in the immedi-
ate future. The role out of smart meters and other associated technology to enable contract enforcement
plus improving information asymmetry will eventually facilitate appliance curtailment contracts. In the
meantime moral hazard and adverse selection may pose too high a financial risk on electricity suppliers.
In locations where appliance contracts are currently available (e.g. United States) contracts focus on air
conditioning where there is a high level of ownership and usage patterns align with peak load periods. In
Ireland ownership rates for dishwashers and clothes dryers are substantially lower at approximately 65% and
55% of households and little information is available on whether the loads associated with these appliances
aligns with system peak loads. Hence the financial risk to electricity suppliers associated with appliance
curtailment contracts in Ireland is likely to be high compared to contracts related to air conditioner use in
the United States.
The lack of identifiable socio-demographic drivers associated with appliance curtailment contracts may
suggest there are less participation barriers associated with appliance curtailment contracts than other policy
instruments that have been used to encourage more sustainable energy use. Beyond the role out of some en-
abling technology, including smart meters, no substantial out-of-pocket investment is required by customers
to participate in such schemes. The households that are excluded from other schemes, due to lack of access
to finance for example, may be the price conscious customers that will ultimately participate in curtailment
contracts.
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